





Volume 31, Issue 2 
  




Steven W. Sumner  
Department of Economics, School of Business, University 
of San Diego 
Guy Yamashiro  
California State University, Long Beach
Abstract 
Using two sources of data on commercial bank liabilities we examine the behavior of various components of deposits 
following a monetary tightening (downturn) as well as a nonmonetary downturn equal in magnitude to the monetary 
downturn in order to better understand the portfolio behavior of commercial banks. We find that the increase in total 
deposits during a monetary tightening (when output is low and interest rates are high) is attributable to an increase in 
small time deposits and that large time deposits and demand deposits exhibit a decrease. This suggests that banks are 
able to, at least partially, offset the potentially adverse effects of a monetary tightening on their balance sheet by 
borrowing and raising additional small time deposits. Further, non-monetary downturns, when both interest rates and 
output are low, seem to have little effect on the liability position of banks.
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It is well established that monetary policy shocks affect economic activity.
1  In particular, 
empirical studies estimated over different time periods and using data from different countries 
indicate that an unexpected monetary tightening is followed by a (delayed) reduction in real 
activity.
2  In contrast, our understanding of exactly how the transmission occurs from the policy 
instrument to the real economy is not as straightforward.  Furthermore, the importance of the 
banking system in accentuating this process is a debated issue.  
For instance, the Federal Reserve’s ability, or inability, to lessen the effects of the recent 
economic downturn, was directly tied to problems in the financial sector.  While the FED 
reduced interest rates aggressively, in the hopes of stimulating the economy, these efforts were 
not successful because banks were simply not willing to lend.  The huge losses suffered by 
financial institutions on housing-related bets, led them to hoard liquid assets for precautionary 
motives.  From a bank lending channel perspective, the financial crisis led to a “credit crunch” 
that made it difficult for many households and firms to obtain the loans they needed to finance 
their spending, which led to further declines in production and employment.  Thus, to better 
understand the limits of the FED’s influence over the economy, it is crucial we understand the 
limits of the FED’s influence over the financial system.   
As a first step in building this understanding, we focus on one specific aspect of the 
central bank-financial system relationship – the link between monetary policy and banks’ 
balance sheets.  Empirical evidence on monetary policy shocks and bank lending (uses of funds) 
is well established.
3  For instance, Den Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro (2007) use disaggregated 
loan data from the Call Reports to document evidence of a bank lending channel for consumer 
and real estate loans, but not for commercial and industrial (C&I) loans.  In particular they find 
that in response to a monetary tightening real estate and consumer loans sharply decrease, while 
C&I loans increase.  They compare these responses to non-monetary shocks in which output 
declines, but interest rates are basically unchanged.  During these non-monetary downturns, C&I 
loans sharply decrease, while real estate and consumer loans show no substantial response.  This 
substitution out of real estate and consumer loans and into C&I loans is not supported by a 
demand side explanation of the increase in C&I loans.
4  Den Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro 
propose that after a monetary tightening—when interest rates are high and production is low—
banks prefer to invest in short-term assets, such as C&I loans that earn a higher interest rate 
(because short-term interest rates are high) and are relatively safe, than invest in long-term and 
risky assets such as real estate loans.  The substitution behavior makes it possible that the supply 
of C&I lending could increase even if there is a decline in deposits (that are used to finance the 
loans).
5   
In this paper, we examine more closely the behavior of the liabilities side (sources of 
funds) of the bank’s balance sheet.  In particular we examine how the banks’ holdings of 
                                                 
1 See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) for detailed discussions on how 
economic variables respond following a monetary policy shock. 
2 Cecchetti (1999), for example, documents that output decreases in all of the eleven OECD countries considered. 
3 See, for example, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000). 
4 Bernanke and Gertler (1995) also find an increase in C&I loans following a monetary tightening, but they point out 
that the "perverse" response of C&I loans could be consistent with a reduction in the supply of C&I loans, as 
predicted by the bank-lending channel theory, as long as the demand for C&I loans increases by more than the 
reduction in the supply. 
5 The reasons given for the change in the desired loan portfolio are related to hedging and safe guarding the capital 
adequacy ratio. 




transactions and nontransactions deposits changes in response to both a monetary tightening and 
nonmonetary downturn.  In ordinary times, we know that banks have access to various sources of 
funds.  Checkable deposits (transactions deposits) used to be an important and low-cost source of 
funds, however, financial innovation and experiences of high interest rates have diminished the 
importance of this source of funds.  The importance of savings and time deposits (CDs) 
(nontransactions deposits), as well as borrowing, have grown in importance over the past four 
decades.  Having access to various sources of funds, while not costless, potentially shelters bank 
loan portfolios when checkable deposits decrease (for example, during a monetary contraction).  
We seek to answer three questions: 
•  What is the impact of rising interest rate on the ability of banks to raise additional funds?  
•  How has the ability of banks to raise additional deposits changed over time?  
•  What is the FED’s role in this process? 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data used and the 
empirical methodology. Section 3 documents the behavior of deposit components after an 
unexpected monetary tightening as well as negative non-monetary shocks. In Section 4 we 
interpret the results and draw some initial conclusions. 
2  DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Our empirical study uses bank balance sheet data from the Reports of Condition and 
Income (Call Reports) together with the federal funds rate, the GDP (chain-type) price index, and 
real GDP.  This sample starts in the first quarter of 1977 and ends in the first quarter of 2010.  
We supplement our results using the Call Report data with monthly (seasonally adjusted) 
banking data for all domestically-chartered commercial banks obtained from the Federal Reserve 
System’s H8 data release.
6  This sample begins in January of 1973 and ends in September of 
2010.  This data set also includes the federal funds rate, the consumer price index, and industrial 
production.
7   
A disadvantage of the H8 data is that they are based on voluntary bank credit reports 
submitted to the Federal Reserve.  Since the reports are voluntary the data are based on only a 
sample of U.S. banks, and are therefore, ‘‘blown up’’ to represent the entire universe.  In 
contrast, since all federally insured banks are required to submit quarterly income statement and 
balance sheet data one can expect the Call Reports to be of higher quality than the H8 data.  A 
drawback of the Call Reports, however, is that constructing consistent time series is not trivial.  
The main reason is that these reports are primarily designed for regulatory purposes and as 
regulation change, variable definitions also change.  This poses a major challenge to the effort of 
constructing consistent time series (e.g. there is no consistent time series for the liability series, 
bank borrowing).
 8  Therefore we choose to supplement the Call Report data with the H8 data.  . 
2.1 Time Series Properties of Deposit Series 
We begin with a brief examination of the time series properties of the liability variables.  
In Figure 1, we document how the liability shares of the different components have evolved over 
time .  It is clear from the Call Report data (Panel A) that deposits make up the overwhelming, 
although shrinking, share of bank liabilities, and thus, bank sources of funds.  Moreover, the  
                                                 
6 This particular universe of banks is virtually identical to the set of commercial banks in the Call reports.  See Den 
Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro (2002) for further details. 
7 The federal funds rate (ffr), real GDP, industrial production, and price index data are all seasonally adjusted and 
downloaded from http://research.stlouisfed.org.  Quarterly observations of the ffr are an average of monthly values. 
8 We should be clear, however, that even though the data are sampled at different frequencies and cover different 
sample periods, the results for these two data sets are very similar.  See Den Haan et al. (2005). 




falling deposit share, from nearly 75% to 60%, is primarily due to the declining importance of 
demand deposits (30% share to less than 10%).  Finally, for the entire sample period, time 
deposits have been the primary source of bank funds.
 9  A similar story is told by the H8 data 
(Panel B).  Deposits make up roughly 75% of liabilities, down from nearly 90% in the early 
1980s.  Other deposits (demand deposits and small time deposits), while declining in importance 
over time, still makes up the lion’s share of liabilities (roughly 65%).  The additional insight we 
are able to glean from the H8 data is that it is small time deposits that are the primary source of 
bank funds.  Lastly, borrowings account for nearly 20% of liabilities (a steady increase was 
experienced during the 1990s). 
Each panel of Figure 2 shows detrended real GDP, the interest rate, and the indicated 
detrended (Call) liability component.  Also, denoted in the diagrams are six episodes in which 
the interest rate reaches a (local) peak.  These include four events in the eighties, one at the 
beginning of the millennium, and one in 2007.  The figure documents that each episode 
(indicated in the graph with a vertical line) is followed by a period in which real GDP is below 
its trend value, except for the event in the mid-eighties when GDP stays right at its trend level.  
The different deposit components behave differently following the interest rate hikes.  As shown 
in Panel A, the cyclical component of total deposits follows the behavior of the cyclical 
component of real GDP exhibiting leading behavior.  Demand deposits are much more volatile 
(as seen in Panel B), but display a similar pattern to total deposits.  The contemporaneous 
correlation between the cyclical component of real GDP and total deposits is equal to 0.14 (0.44 
when total deposits are lagged one year) and with demand deposits it is slightly more, equal to 
0.19 (0.29 when demand deposits are lagged one year).  The behavior of time deposits is 
different than the behavior of both total and demand deposits.  Time deposits appear to increase 
following higher interest rates (although with somewhat of a delay).  The correlation of the 
cyclical components of real GDP and time deposits is -0.28 (-0.32 when time deposits are led 
two quarters).  For total liabilities the contemporaneous correlation is -0.16 (-0.43 when total 
liabilities are led three quarters). 
Figure 3 plots detrended industrial production, the interest rate, and the indicated 
detrended (H8) liability component.  Further, as in figure 2, in each diagram we denote seven 
episodes in which the interest rate reaches a (local) peak.
10  Although the frequency of the data 
differs, the results for total deposits are similar, with the correlation between the cyclical 
component of industrial production and total deposits lagged one year equal to 0.34.  Large time 
deposits (Panel B) behave quite differently, roughly moving counter to industrial production 
(contemporaneous correlation equal to -0.11 and -0.38 when large time deposits are lagged 6 
months).  In contrast, with the exception of a few episodes, other deposits closely follow 
industrial production.  In fact, the cyclical component of other deposits almost appears to lead 
movements in industrial production.  The correlation between the industrial production and other 
deposits lagged one year is 0.43.  Bank borrowings are clearly the most volatile of the liability 
components, with wild swings in borrowing in early 1970s, late 1970s, early 1980s, and most 
recently in 2009.  Interestingly all of these times were marked by strong economic uncertainty.  
The correlation between the cyclical component of industrial production and bank borrowings is 
0.05.  Finally, similar to the Call data, the correlation of total liabilities with industrial production 
                                                 
9 Note that these liability shares are not “exact” measurements.  While the component series only include data held 
by banks domestically, the total liabilities series includes liabilities held both domestically and internationally.  
Domestic-only data are not available in the Call Reports.   
10 Because the sample for the H8 data is longer, there is one additional period of high interest rates in 1974. 





2.2 Empirical Methodology 
We follow the following procedure to estimate the behavior of the variables following a 
monetary shock.  The standard procedure to study the impact of monetary policy on economic 
variables is to estimate a structural VAR using a limited set of variables. 
Consider the following VAR:
11 
  t q t q t t u Z B Z B Z + + + = − − " 1 1  (1) 
where  [] t t t t X r X Z 2 1 , , ′ ′ = ,  tt X′ is a (k1 x 1) vector with elements whose contemporaneous values 
are in the information set of the central bank, rt is the federal funds rate, and  t X 2 ′ is a (k2 x 1) 
vector with elements whose contemporaneous values are not in the information set of the central 
bank, and ut is a (k x 1) vector of residual terms with k = k1 + 1 +  k2.  All lagged values are 
assumed to be in the information set of the central bank.  In order to proceed, one has to assume 
that there is a relationship between the reduced-form error terms, ut and the fundamental or 
structural shocks to the economy, εt.  This relationship is assumed to be given by: 
  t t A u ε =  (2) 
where  A  is a (k x k) matrix of coefficients and εt. is a (k x 1) vector of fundamental uncorrelated 
shocks, each with a unit standard deviation.  Thus,  
  [ ] A A u u E t t ′ = ′  (3) 
When  [] t tu u E ′  is replaced by its sample analogue, one obtains k(k+1)/2 conditions on the 
coefficients in  A .  Since  A  has k
2 elements, k(k-1)/2 additional restrictions are needed to 
estimate all elements of  A .  A standard practice is to obtain the additional restrictions by 
assuming that A  is a lower-triangular matrix.  Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), 
however, show that to determine the effects of a monetary policy shock one can work with the 
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 (4) 
where  11 A is a (k1 x k1) matrix,  21 A is a (1 x k1) matrix,  31 A is a (k2 x k1) matrix,  22 A is a (1 x 1) 
matrix,  32 A is a (k2 x 1) matrix,  33 A is a (k2 x k2) matrix, and  ixj 0 is a (i x j) matrix with zero 
elements.  Note that this structure is consistent with assumption made above about the 
information set of the central bank. 
Our benchmark specification is based on the assumption that X2t is empty and that all 
other elements are, thus, in X1t.  Intuitively, X2t being empty means that the central bank responds 
to contemporaneous innovations in all of the variables of the system.  It also means that none of 
the variables can respond contemporaneously to monetary policy.
12   
In this paper, we compare the behavior of variables after an unexpected monetary 
tightening with the behavior after an unexpected negative non-monetary or "output" shock.  The 
                                                 
11 To simplify the expression we do not display constants, trend terms, or seasonal dummies that are included in the 
empirical implementation. 
12 The results are similar under the alternative assumption that the monetary authority does not respond to 
contemporaneous innovations of the other variables in the system. 




monetary downturn examined in the paper not only reflects the direct responses of the variables 
to an increase in the interest rate, but also the indirect responses to changes in the other variables, 
and, in particular, to the decline in real activity.  To parse out the indirect effects of real activity 
on bank variables, we compare the behavior of the bank variables during a monetary downturn 
with their behavior during a non-monetary downturn of equal magnitude.  While the monetary 
downturn is caused by an unexpected increase in the interest rate, a non-monetary downturn is 
caused by one or more output shocks.  In particular, the non-monetary downturn is caused by a 
sequence of output shocks such that output follows the exact same path as it does during a 
monetary downturn.  We construct the shock(s) in this way to cleanly differentiate the indirect 
effects of real activity on the bank variables. The key difference, then, between the two 
downturns is the behavior of the interest rate. The advantage of this approach is that the 
interpretations of the impulses are not complicated by real activity behaving differently across 
the downturns. Thus, the difference between the impulse response functions for the bank 
variables of the monetary and non-monetary downturn can be interpreted as the effect of the 
increase in the interest rate holding real activity constant.  That is, by comparing the behavior of 
the bank components during a monetary and non-monetary downturn, we filter out the changes 
in demand and supply that are caused by the reduction in output. 
2.3 Specification of the VARs and Standard Errors 
Each VAR includes one year of lagged variables, a constant, a linear trend, and seasonal 
dummies to adjust the data for any seasonality.  The coefficients are estimated with ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and the significance levels are established using a Monte Carlo procedure 
with 5,000 replications in which data are generated by bootstrapping the estimated residuals.  To 
avoid clutter we do not report confidence bands in the graphs, but instead use open and solid 
squares to indicate that an estimate is significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.
13 
3  Results 
We begin by examining the behavior of the variables in a VAR that includes total 
deposits (the largest component of liabilities) in response to a monetary tightening.  Other 
variables included in each specification of the VAR are a real activity measure, a price level 
measure, and the federal funds rate.  Note we follow the assumption that the FED does respond 
contemporaneously to innovations in the other variables of the system, but that the other 
variables do not respond contemporaneously to innovations in monetary policy.   
3.1 Responses of Total Deposits 
The next two figures plot the responses of the variables in the system to a one-standard 
deviation shock to the federal funds rate for both the Call data (Figure 4) and the H8 data (Figure 
5).  Panel A displays the response of the real activity measure (real GDP and industrial 
production, respectively) to the shock.  As can be seen, the results correspond to those found in 
the literature.  Output exhibits a significant drop for almost two years (the drop in industrial 
production is larger than the decline in real gdp) and takes several years to return to the baseline.  
The price level responses are shown in Panel B, and, in the case of the H8 dataset, display 
evidence of a price puzzle.
14  Panel D documents the behavior of the federal funds rate following 
the shock.  The initial response is an increase in the federal funds rate of approximately 80 basis 
points for the Call dataset and 60 basis points for the H8 dataset.  It gradually returns to zero but 
                                                 
13 Significance levels are for one-sided tests. 
14 As noted in the literature, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) find that adding an index for sensitive 
commodity prices solves the price puzzle in their sample.  Barth and Ramey (2001) and Gaiotti and Secchi (2004) 
argue that, through a cost channel, increases in the interest rate could actually lead to an increase in the price level. 




is still significantly different from zero after one year.  Panel C plots the behavior of total 
deposits in response to the monetary tightening.  Interestingly, the results are slightly different.  
In Figure 4, total deposits, shows a delayed but significant persistent increase.  In Figure 5, total 
deposits, after an initial decrease, displays a significant (10% level) increase.  While there are 
slight differences in the responses, the general conclusions drawn from the diagrams would be 
the same.
15   
Also shown in the diagrams are the responses to the non-monetary shock described in 
section 2.  The results are consistent with the results found in Den Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro 
(2007).  Recall, the behavior of the output variable has been designed to follow an identical path 
of its response during the monetary downturn.  As seen in panel D, the federal funds rate 
displays a slight decrease as would be expected if the FED was following some type of Taylor 
rule.  In panel C, we can see that total deposits do not respond much to the non-monetary 
downturn when we use the Call dataset and exhibit a delayed positive response after one year 
when the H8 dataset is used.  Therefore, it appears that it is the change in interest rates and not 
the change in real activity that is driving the response of total deposits.   
3.2 Responses of Deposit Components 
As shown in Den Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro (2007), it is often useful to disaggregate 
data to better understand the underlying behavior of an aggregated variable.  In particular, they 
show that while total loans show an inconsistent response to monetary policy, the components of 
total loans exhibit significant and robust responses that differ across the loan components.  As a 
result we examine a VAR that includes the individual components of liabilities.    
Figures 6 and 7 plot the responses of the liability components.
16  Figure 6 plots the 
responses of the Call liability components.  As can be seen the figures, the responses of these 
two components are very different.  In particular, demand deposits (Panel A) display a mild 
decline in response to the monetary tightening that reaches a maximum in approximately a year.  
Time deposits (Panel B) on the other hand after a delay of approximately one year, show a 
significant and larger increase following the monetary tightening that reaches a peak after 
approximately three years.  This suggests that the (delayed) increase evident in total deposits 
should be attributed to an increase in time deposits.  In fact it appears that banks are able to offset 
the decline in demand deposits by raising time deposits.  Once again, the deposit components 
show very little movement during the nonmonetary downturn when interest rates show very little 
movement. 
As an additional exercise, we look at how the H8 liability components respond in the 
benchmark VAR.  In particular, Figure 7 plots the behavior of large time deposits (Panel A), 
other deposits (Panel B), and bank borrowing (Panel C).  These results are of interest because the 
difference in the breakdown of the components of liabilities, between the Call and H8 data, 
provides additional insights into how banks adjust the liability side of their balance sheets in 
response to interest rate changes.  For instance, Panel A reveals that the observed increase in 
time deposits during a monetary downturn is driven by small time deposits.  We infer this from 
the fact that although time deposits significantly increase during a monetary downturn (Figure 6, 
Panel B), large time deposits, aside from a small initial increase, significantly declines in 
response to a negative monetary policy shock.  Other deposits (Panel B), exhibit a small decrease 
                                                 
15 Results are robust to changing the assumption of the information that the FED has in making decisions regarding 
monetary policy.   
16 Because the responses of output, the price level, and the federal funds rate, are similar to what we found in the 
VAR model that only included total deposits we do not include those results here.     




but then return to baseline.  It can be inferred that the decrease is driven by a decline in demand 
deposits and savings accounts (based on results from Figure 6 (Panel A) and that small time 
deposits must be increasing).  Finally, panel C of figure 7 displays the response of the bank 
borrowings variable.  There is an initial positive response following the monetary tightening, 
while during a nonmonetary downturn the series displays a significant decline, bottoming out 
nearly three years after the shock.   
4.  Interpretation and Conclusions 
Understanding what happens during the monetary transmission mechanism is a difficult 
question.  This paper has attempted to document more closely the behavior of the sources of 
bank funds following a monetary tightening using two datasets.  By looking at the components of 
liabilities we can see that the small decline in total deposits is attributable to the decline in 
demand deposits.  Additionally, there appears to be evidence of a substitution out of demand 
deposits and into time deposits.  This is most likely caused by the desire of banks to continue to 
offer loans but being unable to issue the same level of demand deposits due to the increased cost 
of these deposits.   
Black, Hancock, and Passmore (2007) examine the importance of bank deposits in 
mitigating the effects of monetary policy using a bank level approach.  They find that there is a 
subset of “traditional” banks
17 that lend less than the core deposits that they take in.  Therefore, 
when a monetary policy shock hits, they are able to buffer their loan portfolio from the decrease 
in deposits.  For these banks there is no bank lending channel.  Likewise banks that already have 
a high proportion of managed liabilities, do not suffer from the adjustment from insured to 
managed liabilities and therefore also do not suffer from a bank lending channel.  The banks that 
are most effected by monetary policy are those that have a high degree of relationship lending 
and do not have excess core deposits.  Drawing off of these results, it would be nice to examine 
measures of core deposits in response to monetary tightening perhaps across states or regions to 
see if differing effects are found.  
As Woodford (2010) points out, however, how important these changes in bank liabilities 
are to real activity depend on a number of factors.  Do banks have alternative sources of funds to 
deposits?  And, if so, how does this affect the sensitivity of bank lending to changes in bank 
liabilities?  Perhaps, most importantly, how important are banks as a source of funds for firms?  
Clearly, the answers to these questions 10 years ago are very different to the answers today.  
Thus, how much of the severity of the recent downturn can be attributed to the financial crisis’ 
impact on bank liabilities?   
The question we sought to answer in this paper was much more specific, and modest.  We 
examine how banks adjust the liability side of their balance sheets in response to monetary 
policy shocks.  We find that during monetary downturns, when output is low and interest rates 
are high, banks are able to, at least partially, offset the potentially adverse effects on their 
balance sheet by borrowing and raising additional small time deposits.  Further, non-monetary 
downturns, when both interest rates and output are low, seem to have little effect on the liability 
position of banks.  Taken together, this implies that changes in interest rates, not real activity, 
influence the composition of bank liabilities.  This provides evidence that the FED, while 
perhaps not being able to strongly impact the level of liabilities, has the ability to influence the 
composition.  The real question, as we mention above, is what kind of impact, if any, do these 
changes have on lending?  That is a question we hope to address in future work.  
                                                 
17 Banks that focus on relationship lending (most likely have bank-dependent borrowers). 
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